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ABSTRACT:	This	article	is	a	revised	version	of	the	keynote	presented	at	LAK	’16	in	Edinburgh.	The	
article	 investigates	 some	 of	 the	 assumptions	 of	 learning	 analytics,	 notably	 those	 related	 to	
behaviourism.	Building	on	the	work	of	Ivan	Pavlov,	Herbert	Simon,	and	James	Gibson	as	ways	of	
“learning	 as	 a	 machine,”	 the	 article	 then	 develops	 two	 levels	 of	 investigation	 (processing	 of	
personal	 data	 and	 profiling	 based	 on	 machine	 learning)	 to	 assess	 how	 data	 driven	 education	
affects	 privacy,	 non-discrimination,	 and	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence.	 Finally,	 the	 article	
discusses	how	data	minimization	and	profile	transparency	will	contribute	to	the	methodological	
integrity	of	 learning	analytics,	while	protecting	the	 fundamental	 rights	and	 freedoms	of	human	
learners	thus	safeguarding	the	creativity,	humour,	and	contestability	of	human	learning.	
Keywords:	Data	protection,	data	protection	by	design,	privacy,	machine	learning,	behaviourism,	
nudging,	Pavlov,	Simon,	Gibson,	capture,	optimization,	affordance	
1 INTRODUCTION 
Human	beings	learn	from	the	moment	they	are	born	(Jarvis,	2005;	Campbell	&	Dawson,	1995),	and	even	
before	that.	We	learn	because	we	are	vulnerable,	because	we	can	suffer,	because	we	have	something	to	
lose.	We	learn	because	we	can	die	—	because	we	will	die,	like	all	living	organisms	(or	nearly	all),	and	we	
want	to	delay	that	moment	and	flourish.	We	learn	for	the	joy	of	learning,	we	are	aware	that	we	learn,	
and	 we	 help	 others	 to	 learn	 (our	 children,	 friends,	 colleagues,	 pupils).	 Machines	 learn	 because	 we	
configure	them	as	such,	to	perform	specific	tasks	for	us,	or	even	because	we	will	learn	from	them	about	
new	solutions	to	known	problems,	about	the	problems	that	we	missed,	and	we	even	configure	machines	
to	learn	for	the	pure	joy	of	it	—	as	part	of	our	creativity.1	Machines	also	learn	to	contribute	to	our	own	
learning	processes.	
The	LAK	’16	conference	was	(also)	about	privacy	and	learning	analytics	(LA),2	making	a	pivotal	point	by	
investigating	the	pitfalls	of	data-driven	learning	as	an	issue	that	should	inform	the	development	of	LA	as	
a	 discipline,	 instead	 of	 framing	 such	 issues	 as	 side-effects	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 at	 a	 later	 stage.	 Having	
studied	 the	 new	 Journal	 of	 Learning	Analytics,	 I	must	 admit	 to	 being	 deeply	 impressed	with	 the	 high	
                                            
1	On	the	challenges	of	computational	creativity,	see	Leijnen	(2014).		
2	Special	2016	issue	on	“Ethics	and	Privacy	in	Learning	Analytics,”	Journal	of	Learning	Analytics,	3(1).	
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standards	of	research	and	the	integration	of	methodological,	ethical,	and	legal	reflection.3	In	my	keynote	
—	and	in	this	paper	—	I	contribute	to	such	reflection	by	raising	the	question	of	how	machine	learning	
will	 affect	 human	 learning,	 highlighting	 the	 need	 for	 effective	 redress	 of	 learners	 subjected	 to	
automated	scoring	practices	based	on	LA. This	is	the	introduction.	
LA	can	be	defined	as	data-driven	applications	that	help	students	to	 improve	their	 learning	behaviours,	
and/or	applications	that	help	schools,	colleges,	and	universities	to	manage,	coordinate,	and	administrate	
information	 and	 communication	 regarding	 the	 progress	 of	 their	 students’	 performances	 (Baker	 &	
Inventado,	2014).	Such	progress	is	measured	in	machine-readable	format,	which	implies	that	whichever	
part	of	the	learning	process	cannot	be	made	machine-readable	will	not	be	part	of	learning	analytics	and	
will	not	feed	into	the	performance	metrics.	To	the	extent	that	these	performance	metrics	will	come	to	
determine	our	 learning	processes,	we	need	to	acknowledge	that	whatever	remains	off	the	radar	of	LA	
will	not	visibly	contribute	to	the	flourishing	of	the	students	or	the	learning	institutions	we	develop	and	
create.	 This	may	have	 consequences	 for	 individual	 liberty	 and	 for	 the	dignity	 of	 individuals	 insofar	 as	
their	 learning	 capabilities	 cannot	 be	 translated	 into	 machine-readable	 formats.4	 The	 famous	 legal	
philosopher	Dworkin	summed	up	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	terms	of	equal	respect	and	concern	
for	each	 individual	person.	This	grounds	democracy	—	one	person,	one	vote	—	and	the	rule	of	 law	—	
human	rights	overrule	majoritarian	disrespect	(Dworkin,	1991).	To	the	extent	that	a	person	is	reduced	to	
inferences	about	her	machine-readable	behaviours,	and	targeted	based	on	such	inferences,	her	freedom	
from	unreasonable	 constraints	 (liberty)	 to	 construct	her	 identity	 (dignity)	may	be	 violated.	 This	 is	 not	
merely	 her	 private	 interest,	 but	 regards	 the	 capability	 of	 each	 and	 every	 citizen	 to	 develop	 an	
independent	mind,	which	 is	the	unspoken	assumption	of	a	viable	democracy.	Being	tested	by	 learning	
machines	will	lure	learners	into	“thinking”	like	them,	because	they	need	to	anticipate	how	these	systems	
anticipate	them.	Learners	may	even	start	thinking	in	terms	of	their	behaviours	instead	of	their	actions,5	
or	 be	 nudged	 into	 a	 preconceived	 learning	 process	 instead	 of	 being	 challenged	 to	 develop	 a	 critical	
distance.6	The	 latter	has	consequences	 for	our	capability	 to	engage	 in	democratic	participation,	which	
depends	on	independent	minds	willing	to	challenge	convention,	power,	and	authority.	
In	this	paper,	I	will	 investigate	such	potential	implications	in	the	light	of	data	protection	law.	I	will	not,	
however,	merely	provide	an	analysis	of	current	and	upcoming	legal	rules.	Rather,	I	hope	to	explain	what	
is	at	stake	when	employing	LA	and	how	EU	data	protection	law	addresses	potential	threats.	I	will	argue	
that	to	develop	and	integrate	fair	and	sustainable	LA	into	future	proof	learning	institutions,	we	need	to	
build	 effective	 protection	 and	 feedback	 into	 the	 relevant	 architectures,	where	 feedback	 concerns	 the	
inner	 workings	 of	 the	 analytics	 and	 the	 foreseeable	 consequences	 of	 their	 scoring	 operations.	 This	
should	enable	the	contestation	of	the	analytics,	whenever	it	significantly	affects	an	individual	learner.	In	
section	two,	I	will	distinguish	two	levels	of	LA:	1)	interventions	at	the	level	of	identifiable	students,	and	
                                            
3	For	excellent	methodological	reflection,	see	Berg,	Mol,	Kismihók,	and	Sclater	(2016).	
4	One	could	rephrase	by	inquiring	how	LA	scoring	practices	affect	the	agency	and	vulnerability	of	individual	human	learners,	see	
saliently	Prinsloo	and	Slade	(2016).	
5	For	a	salient	investigation	of	the	difference	between	behaviour	and	action,	see	Vender	(2011).	
6	On	“the	pre-emption	of	intent,”	see	McStay	(2011). 
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2)	analysis	and	prediction	based	on	aggregate	data.	Those	concerned	about	data	protection	often	get	
stuck	at	level	1,	because	this	regards	the	processing	of	personal	data.	My	main	concern	here	is	with	level	
2,	 because	 it	 enables	 personalized	 targeting	 based	 on	 machine	 learning.	 In	 section	 three,	 I	 will	
investigate	how	we	should	understand	the	idea	of	“learning	as	a	machine,”	distinguishing	1)	the	Pavlov	
approach,	2)	the	Simon	approach,	and	3)	the	Gibson	approach.	This	will	enable	us	to	better	frame	the	
threats	that	LA	poses	to	privacy,	non-discrimination,	due	process,	and	the	presumption	of	innocence,	to	
be	discussed	 in	 section	 four	at	both	 levels.	 Finally,	 in	 section	 five,	 I	will	discuss	 the	 legal	obligation	 to	
provide	profile	 transparency,	and	how	data	protection	by	design	could	serve	as	an	effective	means	to	
achieve	“technological	due	process”	within	the	settings	of	LA.	
2 TWO LEVELS OF LA 
2.1 First Level of LA: Processing Personal Data 
First,	 LA	 concerns	 interventions	at	 the	 level	of	 an	 identifiable	 student,	both	when	collecting	her	data,	
and	when	applying	the	results	of	LA	to	her,	whether	or	not	she	is	aware	of	this.	Note	that	in	terms	of	EU	
data	 protection	 law,	 identifiability	 includes	 both	 direct	 and	 indirect	 identification,	while	 identification	
includes	 “being	 singled	 out.”7	 The	 data	 collected	 may	 be	 data	 about	 previous	 grades,	 previously	
attended	schools	or	universities,	 records	of	 teachers’	evaluations,	grading,	all	 types	of	 tests,	and	even	
alumni	data	capable	of	linking	school	or	college	behaviours	with	employment	achievements.	This	type	of	
data	processing	concerns	the	automation	of	previously	manual	administration.	LA,	however,	also	refers	
to	 the	 collection	 of	 behavioural	 data,	 traced	 and	 tracked	 from	 new	 types	 of	 software	 that	 enable	
eLearning	 (Clark	 &	 Mayer,	 2011).	 Such	 behavioural	 data	 may	 include	 keystroke	 and	 clickstream	
behaviours	that	trace	reading	habits	and	measure	time	spent	on	various	tasks,	or,	for	instance	biometric	
behaviours	such	as	eye	movements	that	indicate	boredom	or	loss	of	focus.	It	is	pivotal	to	note	that	such	
behavioural	data	may	also	be	derived	from	sources	outside	the	educational	setting	of	the	student	and	
institution.	They	may	concern	social	media	data,	quantified-self	metrics,	or	other	types	of	data	that	may	
—	 for	 instance	 —	 be	 bought	 from	 data	 brokers.	 Such	 out-of-context	 data	 may	 be	 correlated	 with	
educational	 data	 to	 figure	 out	 how	 a	 student’s	 background,	 lifestyle,	 or	 context	 correlates	 with	 her	
learning	achievements.	This	may	actually	be	 legal	or	 illegal,	ethical	or	unethical.	 The	point	 is	 that	 it	 is	
possible.	
Next,	 LA	 concerns	 capturing	 student	 data:	 interventions	 at	 this	 level	 include	 feedback	 given	 to	 the	
student,	such	as	real-time	feedback	during	eLearning	exercises	or	“early-warning”	systems	that	support	
timely	 reconsideration	 of	 a	 student’s	 capacities	 or	 learning	 strategies.	 The	 first	 level,	 however,	 also	
includes	 interventions	regarding	an	 identifiable	student	that	she	may	or	may	not	be	aware	of,	such	as	
                                            
7	Art.	4.1	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	R	2016/697	EU	(GDPR)	defines	personal	data	as	follows:	“‘personal	data’	means	
any	information	relating	to	an	identified	or	identifiable	natural	person	(“data	subject”);	an	identifiable	natural	person	is	one	
who	can	be	identified,	directly	or	indirectly,	in	particular	by	reference	to	an	identifier	such	as	a	name,	an	identification	number,	
location	data,	an	online	identifier	or	to	one	or	more	factors	specific	to	the	physical,	physiological,	genetic,	mental,	economic,	
cultural	or	social	identity	of	that	natural	person.”	Recital	26	determines	that	“singling	out”	renders	a	person	identifiable.	The	
definition	is	nearly	identical	to	the	currently	applicable	art.	2(a)	Data	Protection	Directive	D	95/46/EC	(DPD).	The	GDPR	will	
come	into	force	in	May	2018	and	have	direct	effect	in	all	the	Member	States	of	the	EU,	replacing	relevant	national	law.		
	
(2017).	Learning	as	a	machine:	Crossovers	between	humans	and	machines.	Journal	of	Learning	Analytics,	4(1),	6–23.	
http://dx.doi.org/10.18608/jla.2017.41.3	
ISSN	1929-7750	(online).	The	Journal	of	Learning	Analytics	works	under	a	Creative	Commons	License,	Attribution	-	NonCommercial-NoDerivs	3.0	Unported	(CC	BY-NC-ND	3.0)	
	 9	
real-time	 reconfiguration	 of	 her	 adaptive	 eLearning	 software,	 placement	 in	 a	 specific	 class	 or	 group,	
automated	evaluation	of	tests,	referral	to	a	counsellor,	selection	for	awards,	grants,	or	being	categorized	
as	a	potential	drop-out,	or	failure	to	meet	the	standards	of	the	course	or	educational	institution	(Fiaidhi,	
2014;	 Kalampokis,	 Tambouris,	 &	 Tarabanis,	 2013).	 It	 could	 eventually	 include	 decisions	 based	 on	
inferences	concerning	health	risks,	drug	abuse,	earning	capacity,	 financial	 resources,	or	public	security	
risks. 
2.2 Second Level of LA: Analytics, Machine Learning, KDD 
The	 second	 level	 of	 intervention	 is	 not	 about	 interaction	with	 identifiable	 students,	 but	 concerns	 the	
analyses	 of	 the	 data	 that	 prepare	 potential	 interventions	 regarding	 the	 student.	 This	 data	 can	 be	
anonymous	data	or	personal	data;	if	it	is	personal	data,	it	can	be	pseudonymous.8	Anonymization	would	
rule	 out	 the	 applicability	 of	 data	 protection	 law,	 as	 this	 implies	 that	 the	 data	 no	 longer	 qualifies	 as	
personal	 data.	 Pseudonymization	 implies	 that	 the	 “anonymization”	 is	 not	 irreversible,	 and	 therefore	
data	protection	law	applies.9	Pseudonymization,	however,	may	qualify	as	proper	protection	of	the	data,	
meaning	that	it	constitutes	security	by	design	or	data	protection	by	design.	This	depends	on	whether	the	
processing	of	the	data	is	fair	and	lawful	and	on	the	kinds	of	risks	it	entails	for	data	subjects	(the	learner).	
The	 processing	 is	 unlawful	 if	 there	 is	 no	 legal	 ground	 or	 because	 the	 purpose	 of	 processing	 is	 not	
legitimate	 or	 has	 been	 exhausted.	 In	 that	 case,	 pseudonymization	 will	 not	 make	 the	 processing	
operations	lawful.10	
Analyzing	 large	amounts	of	data	 can	be	done	by	means	of,	 for	 instance,	 knowledge	discovery	 in	data	
basis	(KDD)	or	machine	learning	(ML).	KDD	has	been	defined	as	a	“nontrivial	process	of	identifying	valid,	
novel,	potentially	useful,	and	ultimately	understandable	patterns	in	data”	(Piatetsky-Shapiro,	1996).	ML	
has	been	defined	as	machines	that	“learn	from	experience	E	with	respect	to	some	class	of	tasks	T	and	
performance	measure	P,	 if	 its	performance	at	tasks	T,	as	measured	by	P,	 improves	with	experience	E”	
(Mitchell,	 2006).	 The	 second	 level	 of	 intervention	 is	 about	 the	 detection	 of	 relevant	 correlations,	
association	 rules,	 and	 so	 forth.	 Basically,	 this	 level	 is	 all	 about	 pinpointing	 the	 key	 classifiers	 that	will	
allow	teachers	and	their	institutions	to	gain	insights	into	the	data	points	deemed	key	to	their	students’	
learning	 capabilities	 and	 to	 their	 organizations’	 achievements.	 This	 can	 be	 done	 by	means	 of	 various	
types	of	machine	learning	(Greller	&	Drachsler,	2012).	It	is	the	second	level	that	forages	patterns	in	big	
                                            
8	Art.	4(5)	GDPR	defines	pseudonymous	data	as	personal	data:	“‘pseudonymization’	means	the	processing	of	personal	data	in	
such	a	manner	that	the	personal	data	can	no	longer	be	attributed	to	a	specific	data	subject	without	the	use	of	additional	
information,	provided	that	such	additional	information	is	kept	separately	and	is	subject	to	technical	and	organizational	
measures	to	ensure	that	the	personal	data	are	not	attributed	to	an	identified	or	identifiable	natural	person.”	
9	Recital	26	GDPR	specifies:	“To	determine	whether	a	natural	person	is	identifiable,	account	should	be	taken	of	all	the	means	
reasonably	likely	to	be	used,	such	as	singling	out,	either	by	the	controller	or	by	another	person	to	identify	the	natural	person	
directly	or	indirectly	[my	emphasis].”	This	means	that	even	encryption	does	not	anonymize,	except	if	the	decryption	key	cannot	
be	accessed	by	anyone	but	the	data	subject.	See	also	Opinion	5/2014	on	Anonymization	Techniques	of	the	Art.	29	Working	
Party,	available	at	http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf	
10	Lawful	processing	requires	one	of	six	legal	grounds,	specified	in	art.	6	GDPR	(art.	7	DPD),	and	compliance	with	the	conditions	
of	art.	5	GDPR	(art.	6	DPD),	notably	that	of	purpose	specification	and	use	limitation.	Recital	28	GDPR	confirms	that	
pseudonymization	can	contribute	to	compliance	with	the	GDPR	by	reducing	the	risks	for	data	subjects.	
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data	to	develop	more	adequate	interventions	at	the	first	level,	in	order	to	improve	the	performance	of	
the	students	and/or	to	advise	them	—	or	even	to	oblige	them	—	“to	change	course.”	Such	patterns	may	
be	about	“when	are	students	ready	to	move	on	the	next	topic?	When	are	students	falling	behind	 in	a	
course?	When	 is	 a	 student	 at	 risk	 for	 not	 completing	 a	 course?	What	 grade	 is	 a	 student	 likely	 to	 get	
without	intervention?	What	is	the	best	next	course	for	a	given	student?	Should	a	student	be	referred	to	
a	counsellor	 for	help?”	 (Fiaidhi,	2014).	This	quotation	 is	 from	of	an	editorial	on	 learning	analytics	 that	
nicely	 sums	 up	 some	 of	 the	 key	 objectives	 of	 LA.	 In	 the	 editorial,	 Fiaidhi	 (2014)	 actually	 proposes	 to	
invest	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 so-called	 unstructured	 data	 to	 further	 the	 objectives	 of	 monitoring	 and	
improving	 the	 cognitive	 and	 intellectual	 development	 of	 “learners.”	 He	 ends	 by	 commending	 a	
comprehensive	 learning	 architecture	 that	 integrates	 the	 analytics	 for	 structured	 and	 for	 unstructured	
data	by	means	of	a	predictive	engine,	a	content	engine,	an	intervention	engine,	a	feedback	engine,	and	
a	 measurement	 engine.	 The	 objectives	 and	 the	 various	 “engines”	 help	 to	 remind	 us	 of	 the	 close	
relationship	of	both	levels	of	intervention,	since	the	second	level	is	instrumental	for	targeting	students	
at	the	first	level,	either	by	providing	them	with	feedback	based	on	the	knowledge	mined,	or	by	providing	
their	teachers,	institutional	management,	employers,	or	others	that	pay	for	their	education	with	advice	
and	relevant	predictions.	Such	predictions	enable	covert	targeting,	excluding	students	from	entering	the	
next	level	of	an	application	or	from	the	next	grade,	from	a	school	or	college,	or	from	remedial	programs.	
This	should	be	kept	in	mind	when	discussing	privacy	and	other	fundamental	rights	that	may	be	infringed	
with	 large-scale	 implementation	 of	 LA.	 Though	 from	 a	 security	 and	 confidentiality	 perspective	
anonymization	or	pseudonymization	should	be	a	primary	concern,	there	are	major	concerns	that	cannot	
be	 addressed	by	 de-identifying	 the	 data	 used	 for	 LA.	 This	 concerns	 not	merely	 privacy,	 but	 also	 non-
discrimination,	due	process,	and	the	presumption	of	innocence.	Moreover,	it	concerns	the	affordances	
of	learning	institutions,	and	the	kind	of	capabilities	they	enable	for	human	learners.11 
3 THREE WAYS OF “LEARNING AS A MACHINE” 
Before	moving	 into	 fundamental	 rights	 infringements,	we	need	 to	understand	what	machine	 learning	
does	(as	a	tool	to	contribute	to	human	learning)	and	how	it	may	transform	the	practice	and	concept	of	
human	 learning.	 This	means	 investigating	 the	 affordances	 of	machine	 learning	 applications	 in	 LA	 and	
how	they	interact	with	the	capabilities	of	human	learners	targeted	by	LA.	The	investigation	will	inquire	
into	 three	 ways	 of	 “learning	 as	 a	 machine,”	 which	 I	 will	 coin	 “the	 Pavlov	 approach,”	 “the	 Simon	
approach,”	and	“the	Gibson	approach.”	After	that,	I	will	investigate	how	second-level	interventions	(KDD	
and	ML	operations)	may	 impact	 fundamental	rights,	and	finally	explain	how	data	protection	by	design	
(DPbD)	may	help	to	prevent	data	obesitas,	loss	of	reputation,	and	untrustworthy	LA	from	destroying	its	
potential	as	a	tool	for	better	education.	
3.1 The Pavlov Approach: Manipulating Behaviour 
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 psychologist	 Ivan	 Pavlov	 developed	 the	 so-called	 stimulus–
                                            
11	On	the	concept	of	an	affordance,	see	chapter	five	in	Gibson	(1986).	On	the	concept	of	a	capability,	see	Sen	(1999)	and	
Nussbaum	(2011).	Both	concepts	emphasize	the	relational	nature	of	an	individual	person	and	her	environment.		
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response	theory	on	learning	mechanisms	(Pavlov,	1927).	He	based	his	theory	on	a	series	of	experiments	
with	a	dog,	allegedly	demonstrating	that	behaviour	is	the	result	of	a	recurrent	chain	of	stimuli	(sensed	
objects	and/or	behaviours,	 such	as	 food	or	 signals	associated	with	provision	of	 food).	These	chains	of	
stimuli	 supposedly	 trigger	 subsequent	 responses	 (actuated	 by	 means	 of	 specific	 behaviours,	 such	 as	
manipulating	a	 lever,	or	producing	 saliva	 in	anticipation	of	 food).	 Interestingly,	Pavlov	was	one	of	 the	
first	 behaviourists,	 claiming	 to	 base	 his	 theoretical	 insights	 on	 observable	 behaviours	 without	 any	
reference	 to	 the	 human	 or	 animal	mind,	which	 he	 treated	 as	 a	 black	 box.	 This	 supposedly	 delivered	
objective,	 scientific	 fact-finding	 instead	 of	 the	 assumedly	 subjective	 theories	 of	 psychologists	 such	 as	
Wilhelm	 Wundt	 (Kim,	 2014),	 who	 based	 their	 inquiries	 into	 the	 human	 mind	 on	 a	 methodology	 of	
introspection	—	 aiming	 to	 observe	 what	 goes	 on	 in	 the	 mind	 of	 an	 individual	 person	 and	 trying	 to	
generalize	 from	there.	One	of	 the	assumptions	of	Pavlov’s	 theory	was	 the	 idea	 that	behaviour	can	be	
explained	 by	means	 of	 physiological	 reflexes	 that	 can	 be	 tested	 in	 an	 experimental	 setting.	 Because	
quite	a	few	behavioural	responses	seem	to	depend	on	adaptation	to	the	environment	instead	of	innate	
reflexes,	Pavlov	developed	experiments	to	“prove”	that	animal	responses	can	be	the	result	of	acquired	
reflexes,	based	on	a	physiological	association	of	specific	events	(the	ringing	of	a	bell)	with	other	specific	
events	 (the	 provision	 of	 food).	 Pavlov’s	 theory	was	 further	 developed	 by	Watson	 (1930)	 and	 Skinner	
(1976),	and	is	actually	closely	connected	with	Turing’s	(1950)	thought	experiment	and	Dennett’s	(1989)	
“intentional	 stance.”	 Both	 Turing	 and	Dennett	 avoid	 the	 issue	 of	 consciousness,	 focusing	 on	whether	
observable	 behaviour	 can	 help	 us	 to	 anticipate	 an	 organism’s	 —	 or	 even	 a	 person’s	 —	 next	 move.	
Watson	(1930),	for	instance,	suggested	that:	
The	interest	of	the	behaviorist	in	man’s	doings	is	more	than	the	interest	of	the	spectator	—	he	
wants	to	control	man’s	reactions	as	physical	scientists	want	to	control	and	manipulate	other	
natural	phenomena.	It	is	the	business	of	behavioristic	psychology	to	be	able	to	predict	and	
control	human	activity.	To	do	this	it	must	gather	scientific	data	by	scientific	methods.	Only	then	
can	the	trained	behaviourist	predict,	given	the	stimulus,	what	reaction	will	take	place;	or,	given	
the	reaction,	state	what	the	situation	or	stimulus	is	that	has	caused	the	reaction.	
Clearly,	 behaviourism	 has	 strong	 links	 with	 determinism	 and	 physicalism,	 assuming	 that	 mind	 is	
ultimately	 a	matter	 of	matter,	 while	 in	 fact	 the	mind	may	 not	 really	matter	 once	we	 can	 detect	 the	
mechanisms	 that	 rule	 behaviour,	 which	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 and	 defined	 by	 the	 laws	 of	
causality.12 
Contemporary	heirs	of	the	behaviourist	approach	can	be	found	in	Pentland’s	(2014)	“social	physics,”	and	
Helbing’s	 (2012)	 “computational	 social	 science.”	 Their	 approaches	 to	 social	 science	 are	 akin	 to	 social	
engineering,	aiming	to	unlock	the	trove	of	knowledge	that	can	be	mined	from	data-driven	applications	
(Pentland)	 and/or	 computational	 simulations	 of	 human	 society	 by	 means	 of	 multi-agent	 systems	
(Helbing).	Both	seek	 the	key	 to	understand	 individuals	as	nodes	 in	a	network,	hoping	 to	contribute	 to	
the	 engineering	 of	 a	 fair	 and	 sustainable	 society.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 if	 we	 know	—	 statistically	—	 how	
people	learn	(how	they	develop	which	conditional	reflexes),	we	can	reconfigure	their	environment	(the	
set	of	relevant	stimuli)	to	make	sure	they	indeed	learn	what	“we”	think	they	should	 learn	(in	terms	of	
                                            
12	On	the	idea	that	the	mind	is	an	accidental	side-effect	of	human	intelligence,	see	Robinson	(2015).	
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behaviour).	The	question	is	who	is	“we”	and	whether	we	really	want	to	manipulate	people	into	learning	
what	 “we”	 think	 is	 best	 (for	 whom?).	 Though	 there	 may	 be	 noble	 intent	 behind	 such	 societal	
engineering,	it	entails	the	assumption	that	we	“learn	as	a	machine,”	and	this	easily	leads	to	attempts	to	
manipulate	us	into	supposedly	“good”	behaviours	as	if	we	were	mindless	pawns	in	a	game	of	chess	(or	
even	Go)	(Thaler	&	Sunstein,	2008;	Hausman	&	Welch,	2010).	Such	a	view	misses	out	on	the	complexity	
of	societal	networks,	the	plasticity	of	the	human	brain,	and	the	vulnerability	as	well	as	the	creativity	of	
both	individual	humans	and	their	society.	This	refers	to	the	intractability	of	human	learning,	and	some	
might	 suggest	 that	 increasing	 computational	 power	 will	 push	 the	 threshold	 of	 this	 intractability.	 But	
there	 is	 also	 the	 question	 of	 computability.13	 Our	 life	 world	 is	 built	 on	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 “natural”	
language	 that	 is	 generative	of	a	highly	dynamic	web	of	meaning.	The	curious	amalgam	of	uncertainty	
and	 creativity	 that	 springs	 from	 our	 language-saturated	 environment	 is	what	 holds	 us	 together	 (as	 a	
people)	and	what	 sets	us	apart	 (from	other	animals).	A	mechanistic	understanding	of	human	 learning	
that	 ignores	 our	 capabilities	 for	 generating	 meaning,	 and	 for	 giving	 reasons	 for	 our	 actions,	 has	 a	
number	of	highly	problematic	ethical	and	epistemological	 implications.	This	may	be	related	to	a	move	
from	teaching	 students,	 that	 is	putting	new	knowledge	 in	 front	of	 them,	 sharing	acquired	knowledge,	
explaining	the	reasons	and	causal	connections	for	such	knowledge,	to	inducing	learning	processes	with	
students,	 that	 is	 manipulating	 their	 environment	 in	 a	 way	 that	 it	 induces	 them	 to	 acquire	 specific	
insights.	 One	 need	 not	 be	 radical	 to	 guess	 that	 this	 will	 corrupt	 their	 autonomy,	 their	 capability	 to	
reason	 and	 to	make	up	 their	 own	mind	 about	what	 to	 learn	how	 (Slade	&	Prinsloo,	 2013;	Dalsgaard,	
2006). 
3.2 The Simon Approach: Optimal Optimization 
In	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	Herbert	Simon	(1983)	wrote	an	intriguing	article	under	the	title	
“Why	 should	 machines	 learn?”	 This	 was	 the	 time	 when	 machine	 learning	 was	 hardly	 a	 success	 and	
notably	 “nerve	net	 learning,”	 as	he	 calls	 it,	 achieved	next	 to	nothing.	 Simon	 (one	of	 the	patriarchs	of	
artificial	 intelligence),	however,	makes	a	number	of	highly	relevant	observations	about	the	differences	
between	human	and	machine	learning.	One	of	his	main	points	refers	to	what	he	calls	“the	tediousness	
of	 human	 learning,”	 as	 this	 is	 a	 slow	 process	 that	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 time.	 To	 achieve	 a	 certain	 level	 of	
knowledge,	people	spend	many	years	in	school,	whereas	once	a	computer	has	been	programmed	with	
specific	knowledge	this	can	easily	be	transferred	from	one	computer	to	the	next	—	no	interant	learning	
process	is	needed:	
[W]e	should	ask	whether	we	really	want	to	make	the	computer	go	through	that	tedious	process,	
or	whether	machines	should	be	programmed	directly	to	perform	tasks	avoiding	humanoid	
learning	entirely!	
Only	one	computer	would	have	to	learn;	not	every	one	would	have	to	go	to	school.	
We	may	 smile	 about	 the	naïveté	of	 the	observation	 Simon	 seems	 to	 endorse,	 but	 I	 guess	 Simon	was	
                                            
13	On	computability,	see	Brey	&	Søraker	(2009).	On	intractability,	see	Dean	(2015).	
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using	 the	 rhetorical	 device	of	 a	 tongue-in-cheek,	making	 the	point	 that	 such	 an	 approach	would	only	
work	 if	 the	 goal	 of	 learning	 were	 a	 matter	 of	 “doing	 the	 same	 task	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 but	 more	
efficiently.”	If,	however,	the	goal	of	learning	is	to	“acquire	the	ability	to	perform	a	wide	range	of	tasks,”	
or	 if	 learning	 refers	 to	 discovering	 new	 knowledge	 and	 finding	 a	way	 to	 retain	 it,	 the	 tediousness	 of	
human	 learning	may	be	 the	best	way	 to	optimize	 the	process.	According	 to	 Simon,	 this	 is	 indeed	 the	
case,	 because	 programs	 facing	 real-life	 problems	 are	 highly	 complex	 and	 suffer	 numerous	 bugs	 and	
computational	artefacts.	This	results	in	them	ending	up	as	being	highly	inefficient	and	ineffective	in	the	
course	 of	 time.	 So,	 he	 says,	 instead	 of	 putting	 all	 hope	 in	 one	 program,	 human	 society	 consists	 of	
numerous	independent	programs	that	allow	for	new	beginnings:	
Old	programs	do	not	learn,	they	simply	fade	away.	So	do	human	beings,	their	undebuggable	
programs	replaced	by	younger,	possibly	less	tangled	ones	in	other	human	heads.	
So,	 the	death	 and	 the	birth	of	 individual	 humans	 serves	 to	 resolve	 the	 legacy	problem	 for	 optimizing	
learning	programs.	Simon’s	ironic	message	is	that	the	fact	that	my	knowledge	and	insights	can	only	be	
transferred	 to	 others	 by	 means	 of	 great	 effort	 on	 both	 sides	 is	 not	 a	 disadvantage	 but	 rather	 an	
incredibly	smart	way	to	ensure	creative	and	robust	adaptation.	Anyone	who	claims	to	have	invented	or	
engineered	 the	 optimal	 learning	machine	 for	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 problems	must	 be	 put	 to	 the	 test	 by	
means	of	retrials	and	alternative	machines.	We	could	frame	this	in	terms	of	Wolpert’s	famous	“no	free	
lunch	 theorem”	 that	 proves	mathematically	 that	 specific	 optimization	mechanisms	 that	 “work”	 for	 a	
specific	 type	 of	 problem	 do	 not	 necessarily	work	 for	 other	 types	 of	 problems	 (Wolpert	 &	Macready,	
1997).	
3.3 The Gibson Approach: The Ecological Niche	
James	 Gibson	 has	 developed	 one	 of	 the	 most	 crucial	 concepts	 for	 our	 current	 age,	 that	 of	 “an	
affordance.”	 It	 is	 firmly	embedded	 in	evolutionary	theory,	physical	reality,	psychological	 inquiry,	and	a	
deep	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 living	 entity	 and	 its	 environment.	 It	 skips	 naïve	
attempts	to	divide	the	world	into	mind	and	matter,	without	discarding	values	or	mental	capabilities.	Let	
me	quote	his	own	definition	of	an	affordance:	
The	affordances	of	the	environment	are	what	it	offers	the	animal,	what	it	provides	or	furnishes,	
either	for	good	or	ill.	The	verb	to	afford	is	found	in	the	dictionary,	but	the	noun	affordance	is	not.	
I	have	made	it	up.	I	mean	by	it	something	that	refers	to	both	the	environment	and	the	animal	in	
a	way	that	no	existing	term	does.	It	implies	the	complementarity	of	the	animal	and	the	
environment.	(Gibson,	1986)	
When	 speaking	 of	 an	 affordance,	 Gibson	 is	 not	 interested	 in	 separating	 objective	 physical	 properties	
from	the	subjective	experience	of	the	perceiving	organism.	Though	this	 is	of	course	possible,	Gibson	is	
interested	in	the	actionable	“properties”	of	an	environment,	which	depend	on	the	agent	that	depends	
on	the	environment.	Each	type	of	agent	thus	has	its	own	ecological	niche:	the	set	of	affordances	tuned	
to	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 agent	 that	 is	 in	 turn	 tuned	 to	 its	 ecological	 niche.	 For	 a	 human	 being,	 this	 for	
instance	 implies	breathable	air,	walkable	surfaces,	graspable	things,	but	also	other	humans	capable	of	
speaking	 or	 learning	 her	 language.	 For	 humans,	 affordances	 are	—	 in	 terms	 of	 Pavlov	—	 the	 set	 of	
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stimuli	that	enable	and	constrain	them	to	behave	one	way	or	another,	including	enabling	them	to	learn	
new	behaviours	or	even	to	unlearn	innate	behaviours.	Other	than	Pavlov’s	determinism,	Gibson’s	keen	
attention	to	the	mutual	shaping	of	an	agent	and	its	ecological	niche	celebrates	creativity	and	renounces	
the	idea	that	either	the	agent	or	the	niche	is	defined	by	their	current	properties.	In	terms	of	Simon,	we	
can	add,	machines	 similarly	depend	on	a	particular	environment	 that	affords	 them	to	 learn	one	 thing	
and	 not	 another.	 As	 we	 know,	 many	 machines	 require	 an	 artificial	 environment	 geared	 to	 their	
behavioural	 potential,	 while	 also	 preventing	 them	 from	 causing	 harm	 to	 their	 human	 masters.	 In	
robotics	 this	 is	 called	 the	envelop	 (Floridi,	2014),	a	controlled	environment	 that	makes	sure	 the	 robot	
finds	 its	 way	 and	 is	 constraint	 in	 ways	 that	 enable	 its	 productivity.	 Since	 environments	 are	 sets	 of	
affordances,	 they	are	contingent	upon	the	type	of	organism	able	 to	perceive	and	act	upon	them.	Fish	
don’t	do	well	on	land;	humans	don’t	do	well	underwater	or	high	up	in	the	air;	surfaces	that	can	sustain	
ants	 may	 not	 sustain	 elephants.	 An	 ecological	 niche,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 the	 habitat	 of	 a	 particular	
organism,	but	the	actionability	of	the	environment	of	that	organism.	
Humans	 have	 managed	 to	 reconfigure	 their	 ecological	 niche	 in	 myriad	 ways	 —	 with	 far-reaching	
consequences	for	other	organisms,	as	we	all	know.	Major	transitions	of	the	affordances	of	our	ecological	
niche	have	been	generated	by	the	introduction	of	tools	to	support	calculation	and	writing,	including	the	
printing	 press.	 Each	 of	 them	 afforded	 entirely	 novel	 learning	mechanisms,	 including	 the	 retention	 of	
what	 has	 been	 learnt	 outside	 the	 body	 of	 an	 individual	 human	 (e.g.,	 on	 a	 piece	 of	 paper).	 This	 has	
triggered	the	establishment	of	formal	learning	and	teaching	institutions	such	as	schools	and	universities,	
as	well	as	archives	and	 libraries	and	other	repositories	of	 retained	knowledge,	such	as	computers	and	
servers.	
What	 fascinates	me	 is	how	Gibson’s	approach	enables	us	 to	 raise	 the	question	of	how	eLearning	and	
other	 types	 of	 LA	will	 transform	 the	 affordances	 of	 our	 learning	 institutions,	 changing	 our	 ecological	
niche	and	thus	also	our	selves.	Whereas,	so	far,	the	other	agents	in	our	niche	were	living	organisms	such	
as	animals,	 from	cattle	 to	pets,	we	are	now	 increasingly	 confronted	with	mindless	 agents	of	our	own	
making,	capable	of	observing	us	and	adapting	their	behaviour	to	the	feedback	they	gain	from	ours.	It	is	
not	merely	that	we	use	these	machines,	for	instance	to	help	us	to	learn	faster	or	more	efficiently,	they	
also	use	us	to	improve	their	performance.	And,	finally,	we	may	come	to	the	point	of	acknowledging	that	
we	are	actually	interacting	with	them	—	e.g.,	teaching	them	how	to	make	us	learn.	Training	algorithms	
on	a	 training	 set	and	checking	 the	outcome	on	 the	 test	 set	 is	already	a	 type	of	 interaction,	especially	
where	knowing	the	precise	operations	of	the	software	is	not	feasible	(as	with	neural	nets)	or	irrelevant	
for	 the	 outcome.	 When	 I	 teach	 a	 human	 person,	 I	 cannot	 access	 her	 brain	 and	 follow	 the	 neural	
operations	—	 they	 would	 certainly	 be	 incomprehensible	 to	 me.	 But	 this	 has	 never	 stopped	 us	 from	
teaching	 or	 otherwise	 interacting	 with	 another	 —	 instead,	 it	 keeps	 us	 on	 our	 toes	 because	 of	 the	
uncertainty	 it	 implies	 and	 the	 creativity	 it	 requires.	 The	 same	 seems	 to	 go	 for	 teaching	 a	 neural	 net.	
However,	other	than	living	beings,	cyber-physical	systems	that	integrate	ML	have	nothing	to	lose;	they	
cannot	suffer	or	fear	their	own	death.	They	can	probably	simulate	all	that	and	more,	based	on	synthetic	
emotions	and	affective	computing;	but	simulation	 is	not	the	same	as	what	 is	simulated.	To	the	extent	
that	our	learning	environments	become	dependent	on	these	systems,	this	may	be	cause	for	concern.	
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What	 should	 concern	 us	 here	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 order	 to	 interact	 with	 machines,	 people	 need	 to	
anticipate	 how	 these	machines	 learn	 (Christian,	 2011).	 This	 goes	 for	 those	 that	 develop	 the	 LA,	 e.g.,	
when	they	train	the	algorithms	for	eLearning,	or	write	the	code	for	administrative	decision-making.	But	
it	also	goes	for	the	students,	e.g.,	when	they	interact	with	eLearning	systems	that	can	only	respond	to	
their	 machine-readable	 behaviours,	 or	 when	 they	 figure	 out	 which	 of	 their	 behaviours	 is	 taken	 into	
account	 when	 decisions	 are	 made	 on	 their	 eligibility	 for	 grants,	 admission	 to	 selected	 courses,	 or	
education	 institutions.	 As	 a	 result,	 our	 ecological	 niche	 may	 increasingly	 be	 shaped	 in	 a	 way	 that	
accommodates	“learning	as	a	machine”	by	humans.	This	is	partly	due	to	the	unfathomable	plasticity	of	
the	human	brain.	Though	we	are	not	born	with	a	reading	brain	we	somehow	manage	to	reconfigure	the	
organization,	the	morphology,	and	the	behaviour	of	our	brains	to	afford	reading,	as	the	combination	of	
experimental	psychology	and	brain	science	has	demonstrated	(Wolf	&	Stoodley,	2008).	Once	we	learned	
to	read	and	write,	our	ecological	niche	was	hugely	extended	with	the	affordances	of	written	and	printed	
text.	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 “ordinary	 people”	 cannot	 develop	 a	 brain	 more	 geared	 to	
mathematics,	 computation,	 and	 calculation	 if	—	as	a	 society	—	we	decide	 to	make	 the	effort	 (Sousa,	
2014).	 This	 might	 indeed	 fast-track	 their	 interactions	 with	 LA	 systems,	 as	 they	 gain	 a	 more	 intuitive	
understanding	 of	 how	 these	machines	 operate	 or	 even	 “think.”	 But	 it	 may	 also	 have	 transformative	
effects	on	what	it	means	to	be	human.	
4 PRIVACY, NON-DISCRIMINATION, DUE PROCESS, AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
4.1 First Level Issues: Identification and Targeting 
As	discussed	above,	the	first	level	concerns	interventions	with	identifiable	individual	learners.	It	is	about	
collection	of	their	personal	data,	whether	from	their	admission	forms	or	Blackboard,	from	teacher	input	
such	as	grades,	or	from	eLearning	applications	that	capture	behavioural	data	(or	even	from	data	troves	
gathered	 outside	 the	 educational	 setting,	 such	 as	 social	 networks	 and	 data	 brokers).	 It	 is	 also	 about	
applying	inferences	based	on	LA	to	an	individual	student,	whether	she	is	aware	of	this	or	not.	This	may	
involve	automated	or	semi-automated	decision-systems	that	categorize	students	and	condition	access	
to	extra	facilities,	counselling,	rewards,	or	grants.	Results	of	LA	may	even	condition	sharing	data	with	the	
police	or	intelligence	agencies.	I	am	speaking	of	affordances,	not	—	yet	—	about	whether	this	is	ethical	
or	legal.	
At	this	level,	privacy	may	be	concerned	whenever	data	is	processed	(for	instance,	shared)	in	a	way	that	
violates	legitimate	expectations,	notably	when	data	is	shared	out	of	context	(Nissenbaum,	2010).	This	is	
at	stake	when	access	to	the	data	within	the	learning	institution	is	not	appropriately	secured	(unreliable	
authentication),	which	results	in	teaching	and	other	staff	being	able	to	look	up	how	a	particular	student	
is	doing	—	without	any	necessity.	This	is	also	at	stake	if	publishers	of	electronic	textbooks	or	eLearning	
software	gain	access	to	the	data	of	individual	students	to	improve	the	functionality	of	their	software,	or	
if	grant	providers	demand	an	abundance	of	personal	data	to	conduct	fraud	detection.	As	Khaliah	Barnes,	
director	 of	 the	 student	 privacy	 project	 at	 the	 Electronic	 Privacy	 Information	 Center	 notes,	 “Rampant	
data	collection	 is	not	only	destroying	student	privacy,	 it	also	threatens	students’	 intellectual	 freedom”	
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(Barnes,	 2014;	 Drachsler	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 tax	 authority,	 the	 police,	 or	 the	 intelligence	 services	may	
demand	access	—	probably	accompanied	by	a	prohibition	to	communicate	this	access	with	the	relevant	
person	or	anyone	else.	This	implies	that	undetected	privacy	infringements	could	easily	occur,	depending	
on	the	whims	of	whoever	is	in	charge.	Unless	a	system	of	safeguards	is	built	into	the	architecture	of	the	
technical	systems	and	the	organizational	design,	privacy	will	be	up	for	grabs.	The	point	here	is	not	bad	
intentions,	but	a	far	greater	threat:	the	transformation	of	the	affordances	of	learning	institutions.	
When	 LA	 inferences	 are	 applied	 to	 an	 individual	 based	 on	 knowledge	 that	 is	 not	 shared	with	 her,	 or	
when	 such	 applications	 confront	 her	 with	 things	 about	 herself	 that	 she	 was	 not	 aware	 of,	 this	 may	
amount	to	another	type	of	privacy	violation	(Hudson,	2005).	 Inferences	may	indicate	health	problems,	
notably	 concerning	mental	 health,	 or	 they	may	 show	 that	 students	with	 a	 certain	 religious	 or	 ethnic	
background	lack	specific	coping	strategies,	resulting	in	failure	to	finish	the	course	or	obtain	the	relevant	
degree.	This	is	not	only	about	privacy,	but	also	about	non-discrimination.	It	may	be	great	to	know	that	
people	 from	 a	 certain	 background	 (ethnic,	 religious,	 gender,	 economic,	 geographic)	 have	 specific	
learning	disabilities	that	can	be	remedied	by	means	of	specific	interventions,	based	on	extensive	AB	test	
designs.14	That	implies,	however,	that	lots	of	students	will	be	used	as	guinea	pigs,	while	their	sensitive	
data	are	employed	for	scientific	research,	to	secure	the	policy	goals	of	the	educational	institution,	or	—	
more	mundane	—	to	increase	the	profits	of	a	service	provider.	
To	the	extent	that	students	are	not	aware	of	all	this,	their	due	process	rights	may	be	at	stake	(Citron	&	
Pasquale,	2014).	They	could	be	placed	in	certain	categories	based	on	clustering	techniques	that	result	in	
classifiers	 that	 discriminate	 (which	 is	 not	 necessarily	 prohibited)	 based	 on	 certain	 features	 that	 their	
“nearest	neighbours”	have,	though	they	may	not	have	these	features	(the	profiles	inferred	will	often	be	
non-distributive).15	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	not	 aware	of	 this,	 they	 cannot	 object.	 Indeed,	 even	 if	
they	knew	about	this,	they	might	have	a	problem	arguing	their	case,	because	the	categorization	may	be	
presented	as	objective	and	applicable	and	could	only	be	countered	by	means	of	software	verification	or	
training	alternative	algorithms	on	the	same	data	set.	Another	problem	is	that	the	arguments	available	to	
object	 to	 their	being	profiled	may	be	 restricted	because	objections	must	be	submitted	online	and	are	
formatted	 in	 a	 specific	way.	 This	 probably	 entails	 that	 arguments	 that	 don’t	 fit	 the	 format	 cannot	 be	
registered.	 Finally,	 those	 involved	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 appeals	 may	 have	 formatted	 responses,	 e.g.,	
stating	that	the	system	does	not	allow	the	argumentation.	This	is	already	often	the	case	when	objecting	
to	 fines	 from	 the	 taxation	 office	 or	 complaining	 about	 telecom	 providers.	 “Computer	 says	 no”	 is	 a	
popular	phrase	for	good	reason	(Dean,	2016).	This,	finally,	touches	upon	the	presumption	of	innocence.	
In	 administrative	 law,	 unlike	 in	 criminal	 law,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 government	 got	 it	 right	 and	 the	
citizen	needs	to	prove	her	innocence.	So,	the	student	may	have	to	prove	that	the	system	got	it	wrong,	in	
terms	dictated	by	 the	system.	Kafka	 is	around	 the	corner	—	or	amongst	us	 (Solove,	2004).	This	 is	not	
science	fiction	and	it	is	not	even	about	bad	intentions;	it	is	about	the	consequences	of	entering	another	
ecological	niche	with	a	different	set	of	affordances.	
                                            
14	For	an	early	precursor	of	AB	research	design	in	an	educational	setting,	see	Foster,	Watson,	Meeks,	and	Young	(2002).	
15	On	non-distributive	profiles,	see	Vedder	(1999). 
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4.2 Second Level Issues: Analytics and Prediction	
Let’s	now	check	second	level	issues.	These	are	entirely	different,	because	the	inferences	drawn	need	not	
be	 personal	 data.	 Instead	 they	 will	 be	 patterns	 in	 the	 data	 set,	 linking	 specific	 attributes	 (features,	
behaviours,	 background,	 context)	 to	 specific	 performance	 metrics	 to	 create	 hindsight	 (what	 kind	 of	
attributes	 correspond	 with	 what	 level	 of	 performance?),	 foresight	 (what	 can	 be	 expected	 ceteris	
paribus?)	 and	 insight	 (which	 interventions	 could	 improve	 future	 student	 performance,	 depending	 on	
what	circumstances?).	The	issue	usually	highlighted	at	this	level	is	privacy	in	the	narrow	sense	of	hiding	
personal	data	and/or	making	sure	that	the	data	is	protected	against	unauthorized	disclosure.	There	are	
now	a	number	of	techniques	meant	to	enable	big	data	analytics	in	compliance	with	data	protection	law,	
based	on	pseudonymization	(as	irreversible	anonymization	is	usually	not	an	option).	Frameworks	such	as	
MIT	OpenPDS	with	its	SafeAnswers	module,16	Max	Planck’s	AIRCLOAK	with	its	Insights	AQR,17	and	the	so-
called	 PEP	 framework	 (polymorphous	 encryption	 &	 pseudonymization)	 developed	 at	 Radboud	
University	 (Verheul,	2015;	Verheul,	 Jacobs,	Meijer,	Hildebrandt,	&	Ruiter,	2016),	provide	sophisticated	
ways	 of	 combining	 encryption	 with	 pseudonymous	 sharing	 or	 enable	 running	 code	 on	 the	 raw	 data	
without	 ever	 sharing	 the	 data	 (zero	 knowledge	 protocols).	 These	 are	 highly	 relevant	 and	 provide	
important	means	of	engaging	in	data	protection	by	default	(data	minimization).	They	do	not,	however,	
go	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	matter.	Once	 a	 service	 provider,	 grant	 provider,	 insurance	 company,	 potential	
employer,	or	educational	institution	gets	ahold	of	the	results	of	the	analytics,	a	new	set	of	affordances	
comes	into	play.	
As	discussed	under	 first	 level	 issues,	 as	 soon	as	 the	 inferences	 are	 applied	 to	 individual	 students,	 the	
infringements	of	privacy,	non-discrimination,	due	process,	and	the	presumption	of	innocence	return	at	
full	speed.	That	is	why	I	devote	the	final	part	of	this	article	to	the	implications	of	LA	for	the	fundamental	
core	 of	 human	 learning,	 i.e.,	 our	 ability	 to	 reflect	 on	 our	 own	 behaviours.	 This	 “ability”	 may	 be	 an	
affordance	of	written	text	that	is	not	necessarily	an	affordance	of	LA.18	
5 PROFILING AND DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN 
5.1 The Relevance of the GDPR for First Level LA: Data Minimization 
The	upcoming	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	consolidates	and	reinforces	the	core	principles	of	the	
current	 Data	 Protection	 Directive.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 will	 be	 a	 game-changer	 for	 those	 who	 process	
personal	data	—	notably	for	those	who	conduct	additional	processing,	engaging	in	secondary	usage,	and	
re-purposing	of	personal	data.	Compared	to	the	DPD,	the	GDPR	will	“do”	three	things	 (amongst	many	
others).	 First,	 it	will	 create	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 for	 stakeholders	 that	 base	 their	 business	 case	 on	 the	
processing	of	personal	data.	This	 level	playing	 field	 is	 the	result	of	deterrence:	high	 fines,	data	breach	
notification,	 transparency	 requirements	 with	 high	 impact	 on	 reputation,	 and	 tort	 liability.19	 This	 will	
                                            
16	http://openpds.media.mit.edu/#architecture.	
17	https://www.aircloak.com/downloads/Aircloak-One-Pager.pdf.		
18	This	has	been	extensively	argued	by	Hildebrandt	(2015).		
19	Art.	83	GDPR	stipulates	that	supervisory	authorities	can	punish	violations	of	the	GDPR	with	fines	of	up	to	4%	of	global	
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institute	 countervailing	 powers	 capable	 of	 mitigating	 some	 of	 the	 problematic	 affordances	 of	 LA	 —	
speaking	law	to	power.	In	the	end,	this	level	playing	field	will	enable	companies	to	act	ethically	without	
being	pushed	out	of	the	market.	Second,	 it	will	require	a	data	protection	impact	assessment	whenever	
high	 risk	 is	 expected	 for	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	 natural	 persons	 (DPIA,	 art.	 35	 GDPR),	 which	 is	
related	to	the	obligation	to	implement	data	protection	by	default	and	by	design	(DPbD,	art.	25	GDPR).	
The	 latter	 requires	 that	 data	 minimization	 and	 other	 legal	 obligations	 be	 embedded	 into	 the	
architecture	 of	 data	 processing	 systems.	 These	 legal	 obligations	will	 reconstruct	 the	 ecological	 niche;	
they	will	reconfigure	the	set	of	affordances	that	emerge	in	the	wake	of	large-scale	application	of	LA.	This	
is	 not	merely	 speaking	 law	 to	power,	but	 architecting	 trustworthy	 infrastructure	 that	 reduces	 risks	 to	
privacy	 and	other	 fundamental	 rights	 by	 default,	 based	on	 the	 technical	 specifications	 of	 LA	 systems.	
Third,	 it	 will	 privilege	 the	 processing	 of	 pseudonymized	 data	—	 subject	 to	 stringent	 conditions	—	 to	
enable	 big	 data	 analysis.20	 In	 combination	with	 the	 previous	 points	 (creating	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 and	
integrating	 data	 protection	 into	 the	 hardwired	 and	 softwared	 LA	 systems),	 this	 will	 provide	 for	 an	
incentive	 structure	 that	 favours	 systems	 that	enable	 secondary	use	 for	a	number	of	 specific	purposes	
while	reducing	the	risk	of	identification.	Again,	this	will	have	a	transformative	impact	on	the	affordances	
of	LA,	as	it	will	simultaneously	constrain	the	use	of	data	that	enables	direct	identification,	while	enabling	
big	 data	 analytics	 on	 pseudonymized	 data.	 An	 excellent	 example	 of	 this	 type	 of	 Data	 Protection	 by	
Design	and	Default	can	be	found	in	the	DELICATE	checklist,	developed	by	Drachsler	and	Greller	(2016),	
highlighting	the	need	to	develop	a	sustainable	framework	for	safe	and	agile	LA	that	safeguards	the	data	
protection	rights	of	learners.	
5.2 The Relevance of the GDPR for Second Level LA: Profile Transparency 
DPbD,	 however,	 also	 applies	 to	 the	 obligation	 of	 profile	 transparency,	 which	 is	 already	 part	 of	 the	
current	legal	framework	but	further	clarified	in	the	GDPR.	I	dare	say	that	profile	transparency	is	the	only	
legal	constraint	that	directly	targets	the	issue	of	due	process	and	the	presumption	of	 innocence	in	the	
case	of	data-driven	applications	that	involve	personal	data.	One	could	say	that	profile	transparency	is	a	
form	of	what	Citron	and	Pasquale	 (2014)	 termed	“technological	due	process”	 in	 their	groundbreaking	
article	on	the	“scored	society.”21	
Profiling	 refers	 to	 the	patterns	 that	 result	 from	ML	operations,	notably	 the	analysis	or	prediction	of	a	
person’s	“performance	at	work,	economic	situation,	health,	personal	preferences,	 interests,	 reliability,	
behaviour,	 location	 or	 movements”	 (art.	 4.4	 GDPR).22	 Profile	 transparency	 requires	 providing	
information	about	 three	 types	of	 information:	1)	 the	existence	of	profiling,	2)	meaningful	 information	
                                                                                                                                             
turnover.	Art.	33	GDPR	imposes	a	duty	to	notify	the	supervisory	authority	within	72	hours	of	a	data	breach,	and	art.	34	GDPR	
imposes	a	similar	duty	to	notify	the	data	subject	whose	data	have	been	leaked,	“[w]hen	the	personal	data	breach	is	likely	to	
result	in	a	high	risk	to	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	natural	persons.”	
20	Art.	6.4.e	GDPR	mitigates	the	duty	to	comply	with	purpose	limitation	in	the	case	of	re-use	and	re-purposing,	qualifying	
pseudonymization	as	a	safeguard	that	may	contribute	to	legitimize	additional	processing.	Art.	25	(DPbD)	qualifies	
pseudonymization	as	an	appropriate	organizational	and	technical	measure	to	comply	with	data	minimization.	Art.	32	(security	
of	personal	data)	qualifies	pseudonymization	as	a	form	of	security	by	design.		
21	See	also	“procedural	data	due	process”	in	Crawford	and	Schultz	(2014). 
22	Still	highly	relevant:	Hildebrandt	and	Gutwirth	(2008),	co-authored	by	computer	scientists,	sociologists,	and	lawyers.		
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about	the	 logic	 involved,	and	3)	 information	about	the	envisaged	consequences	 (art.	13.2.f	and	14.2.g	
GDPR,	12.a	DPD).	Enabling	individuals	to	exercise	this	right	will	be	the	real	challenge,	as	it	implies	taking	
learners	seriously,	engaging	them	on	their	own	terms,	and	helping	them	to	critically	assess	the	learning	
algorithms	 that	 define	 their	 progress	 (Hildebrandt,	 2012).	 This	 is	 crucial	 in	 the	 case	 of	 automated	
decision-making,	especially	when	such	decisions	have	legal	effect	(fail	or	pass	an	exam,	be	admitted	to	a	
learning	 institution	or	 a	 job	position)	 or	 similarly	 significantly	 affect	 the	 concerned	person.	 The	GDPR	
provides	data	subjects	with	a	right	not	to	be	subject	to	such	decisions	(art.	22.1),	and	prohibits	them	if	
they	are	based	on	so-called	sensitive	data	(ethnicity,	religion,	etc.;	art.	22.4).	Here	we	see	how	and	why	
the	 fundamental	 right	 to	 data	 protection	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 privacy	 but	 explicitly	 addresses	 non-
discrimination,	due	process,	and	even	the	presumption	of	innocence	in	its	broadest	sense.	Even	though	
exceptions	 apply,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 the	 GDPR	 is	 ready	 to	 address	 the	 harms	 that	 result	 from	
unwarranted	 automated	 application	 of	 LA.	 Learning	 institutions	 and	 App	 developers	 that	 work	 to	
integrate	 LA	 into	 the	way	we	 learn	 should	 take	 to	 heart	 that	 human	 learning	 is	 not	 in	 the	 first	 place	
about	 the	 management	 of	 learning	 behaviours,	 but	 about	 one	 of	 the	 most	 salient	 characteristics	 of	
being	human.	The	challenge	will	be	to	make	sure	that	learners	are	treated	as	individual	persons	worthy	
of	 equal	 respect	 and	 concern,	 by	 creating	 systems	 that	 afford	 capabilities	 such	 as	 intellectual	
independence,	 critical	 distance,	 and	 human	 flourishing.	 Having	 the	 right	 not	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 the	
outcome	of	fully	automated	LA	decision	machines	may,	therefore,	be	the	most	important	fundamental	
right	in	the	era	of	data-driven	education.	
6 CONCLUSION 
Human	learning	cannot	be	reduced	to	Pavlov’s	stimulus–response	hypothesis.	Even	animals	are	driven	
crazy	 by	 his	 experiments	 that	 disrespect	 their	 animal	 dignity,	while	 the	 limited	 set	 of	 responses	 that	
defines	 their	 laboratory	 situation	 says	 little	 about	 the	 repertoire	 they	 develop	 in	 their	 “normal”	
ecological	niche	(Buytendijk	&	Plessner,	1936;	de	Waal,	2016).	Simon	nicely	demonstrated	the	benefit	of	
individual	learning	processes,	clarifying	how	the	tediousness	of	human	learning	may	be	the	outcome	of	
an	 optimization	 strategy	 in	 view	 of	 the	 unfathomable	 complexity	 of	 human	 society.	 Taking	 Gibson	
seriously,	we	need	to	acknowledge	that	this	complexity	is	connected	with	our	language	capabilities	and	
the	 institutional	dynamics	they	require	and	produce.	Our	ecological	niche	has	myriad	affordances	that	
are	 continuously	 renegotiated	 and	 attuned	 to	 the	 capabilities	 they	 afford	 while	 they	 —	 in	 turn	 —	
reshape	the	niche.	
Core	 to	 human	 learning	 are	 creativity,	 humour,	 and	 reflection,	 corresponding	 with	 art	 and	 ethics,	
judgement,	politics,	and	law.	Creativity	and	humour	combine,	detecting	the	unexpected	with	the	need	
to	 face	both	 life	 and	death.	Reflection	entails	 an	externalized	awareness	of	what	we	 think	we	 learnt,	
instead	 of	 succumbing	 entirely	 to	 unconscious	 learning	 processes.	 That	 is	 why	 teaching	 will	 remain	
crucial	to	democracy.	Teaching	refers	to	explicit	presentation	and	explanation	of	knowledge,	such	that	it	
can	be	the	object	of	debate	and	discussion.	LA	may	be	a	great	way	to	 induce	 learning	processes,	as	 it	
were,	 behind	 a	 person’s	 back	 and,	 although	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 wrong	 or	 bad,	 LA	 must	 be	 (re-)	
configured	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 for	 critical	 reflection	 on	 what	 and	 on	 how	 we	 learn.	 Therefore,	
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pseudonymization,	 encryption,	 and	 discrimination-aware	 data	 mining	 must	 be	 complemented	 with	
profile	transparency	and	the	effective	means	to	object	to	being	profiled	as	a	specific	type	of	learner.	This	
is	what	US	 legal	 scholars	call	 “technological	due	process”;	as	Europeans,	we	should	start	 the	concrete	
implementation	of	profile	transparency	and	the	right	to	object	to	automated	decision-making	as	cutting-
edge	and	pertinent	elements	of	the	Rule	of	Law.	
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